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Denver Journal
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Editor's Foreword
The five-day Conference whose proceedings are reported in this
book was held in January 1974 in the afterglow of the 1972 U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement and in the preliminary shadows of the so-
called Jackson (or Jackson-Vanik) Amendment. Both of these were
the subject of much discussion at the Conference, and in view of
subsequent events a few introductory words must be said about them.
In the 1972 Trade Agreement the executive branch of the United
States government committed itself to the elimination or substantial
reduction of a great many of the American restrictions on trade with
the Soviet Union which had accumulated during the period of acute
tension that followed World War II. By its own terms, however, the
Trade Agreement could not take effect until the U.S. Congress took
legislative action to grant most-favored-nation treatment to imports
of Soviet products, that is, to accord to such imports tariff rates as
favorable as those accorded to imports from any other country. In
1972 and 1973 the Administration proposed a new Trade Act which,
among other things, would repeal the 1951 law subjecting imports
from Communist countries (Yugoslavia was excepted from the begin-
ning and Poland since 1957) to the very high rates of the 1930 Tariff
Act or, to put it otherwise, denying them the benefit of the very
substantial tariff reductions which have been made periodically
under bilateral and multilateral trade agreements since 1934 and
which are applicable to all other countries. However, a proposed
amendment to the Trade Act, sponsored by Senator Henry M. Jack-
son in the Senate and Representative Charles Vanik (among others)
in the House of Representatives, set a condition: in order for a "non-
market economy" to receive most-favored-nation treatment it would
have to show to the satisfaction of the Congress that it permitted free
emigration of its citizens.
In January 1974 it seemed likely, though not certain, that the
Jackson Amendment would eventually be enacted into law. No one
knew, however, what effect its enactment would have on Soviet-
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American trade relations. Perhaps the Soviet leadership would be
able to live with it. In October 1974 that hope was raised by a state-
ment of Senator Jackson in which he read a letter addressed to him
by Secretary of State Kissinger reporting certain assurances which
Mr. Kissinger had received concerning Soviet intentions with regard
to citizens desiring to emigrate.' However, after Congress on Janu-
ary 3, 1975 finally passed the Trade Act of 1974 containing the Jack-
son Amendment,2 the Soviet government denounced it as an inter-
ference in Soviet internal affairs and declared further that it would
not accept a trade status that is discriminatory and it would there-
fore not put the 1972 Trade Agreement into force.3 At this point it
was supposed by many that the efforts of more than three years to
1. See the report of Senator Jackson's press conference of October 18, 1974. The
letter from the Secretary of State to Senator Jackson stated that in "discussions" with
Soviet representatives the United States government had been "assured" that: the
Soviet government considered punitive actions against individuals seeking to emigrate
to be in violation of Soviet law and would not tolerate such practices; unreasonable
impediments would not be placed in the way of persons seeking to emigrate; applica-
tions for emigration would be processed in order of receipt on a nondiscriminatory
basis; hardship cases would be processed sympathetically; a special tax on emigration,
based on reimbursement of the Soviet government for the education it had provided
to the emigrant, which had earlier been introduced and later suspended, would not be
reintroduced; and the United States would be permitted to bring to the attention of
the Soviet government indications that the above listed criteria and practices were not
being applied, such representations to receive "sympathetic consideration and re-
sponse.
Senator Jackson announced his satisfaction with the "understanding," and saw
in it a justification for including in the Trade Reform Act another amendment which
would permit the President to waive for eighteen months the requirements of the
Jackson Amendment. He added, however, that he would consider the release of 60,000
emigrants per annum to be a minimum "benchmark" of Soviet compliance, and unless
this quota were reached, he would oppose extension of MFN status beyond eighteen
months. The President and the State Department had no comment on Senator Jack-
son's announcement, except that the Secretary of State strongly reiterated that the
understanding with the Soviet Union did not specify any minimum number of emi-
grants.
It was widely anticipated in the United States that the "assurances" received by
the Secretary of State signified that the Soviet government would accept the condi-
tions set forth in the Jackson Amendment and would seek to comply with them. In
the light of subsequent Soviet actions, it is more likely that the Soviet government had
hoped that its assurances given to the Secretary of State would lead to a withdrawal
of the Jackson Amendment or at least to a more substantial modification than that
which Senator Jackson made.
2. Trade Act of 1974, Title IV, Pub. L. No. 93-618 (Jan. 3, 1975).
3. See Tass Statement, Pravda, Dec. 19, 1974, containing the letter of Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko of October 26, 1974, concerning the Jackson press
conference, supra note 1; U.S. Department of State Press Release 13 dated Jan. 14,
1975, 72 DEP'T STATE Buii.. 139 (1975), containing Secretary of State Kissinger's news
conference of January 14 announcing Soviet intentions with respect to the 1972 Trade
Agreement.
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revive Soviet-American trade had been wholly frustrated and that
the two countries were about to revert to the situation that existed
from 1948 to 1971 when trade between them was virtually moribund.4
Yet this prediction, too, has thus far proved to be wrong. In fact,
the 1972 Trade Agreement, which technically never took effect at all,
has served as an actual framework for many aspects of trade relations
between the two countries from the time it was signed in August 1972
until the time of this writing (September 1975). It is true that the
Soviet government is not obliged to make further payments on its
World War II "lend-lease" obligations; such payments had been bar-
gained for most-favored-nation treatment. 5 It is also true that, in
addition to the Jackson Amendment to the Trade Act, an amend-
ment to the Export-Import Bank Act, enacted at about the same
time, made extension to the U.S.S.R. of large U.S. government cred-
its likewise conditional upon changes in Soviet emigration policy.6
Some observers at the time were of the opinion that the credit restric-
tions were even more offensive to the Soviet government and consti-
tuted an even greater barrier to expansion of Soviet-American trade
than discriminatory tariff treatment. Nevertheless, trade between
the two countries, which rose dramatically in 1972-74, did not decline
significantly in 1975, although it was undoubtedly hampered some-
what by the American restrictions and by the Soviet response to
them.7 Meanwhile, the President has indicated his firm intention to
4. In 1971 trade turnover between the United States and the Soviet Union was
approximately $200 million. This represented .2 per cent of total U.S. trade and .8 per
cent of total U.S.S.R. trade. In 1972 trade turnover between the two countries was
approximately $650 million. In 1973 it was approximately $1.4 billion. In 1974 it was
approximately $960 million.
5. Under the Lend-Lease Settlement of October 18, 1972, the Soviets were to pay
to the United States $722 million over a period ending July 1, 2001. $12 million was
paid on October 18, 1972, and $24 million was to be paid on July 1, 1973, and $12
million on July 1, 1975. In addition, 28 equal annual installments of approximately $24
million were to commence in 1974 or 1975 after most-favored-nation treatment was
granted to the Soviet Union. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S.-U.S.S.R. COM-
MERCIAL AGREEMENTS 1972: TEXTS, SUMMARIES, AND SUPPORTING PAPERS 103 (1973). The
installments of July 1, 1973, and July 1, 1975, were paid. The Soviets have not denied
that they owe the United States for certain materials delivered under the World War
II agreements, especially materials delivered after the end of the war. However, they
have always insisted that the wartime agreements contemplated repayment in the
context of the establishment of normal trade relations between the two countries after
the war, and that such normal trade relations require the granting of reciprocal most-
favored-nation treatment.
6. See Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, 1975 Amendments, 12 U.S.C. § § 635-
635n.
7. U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade turnover in the first six months of 1975 totalled $659 mil-
lion. If this figure is projected on a twelve-month basis, it exceeds that of 1974 and
that of 1973. On the other hand, the total trade of each of the two countries was
substantially larger in 1975 than in 1974. In addition the increase of Soviet trade with
1975
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put before the Congress proposals to repeal the credit and tariff re-
strictions enacted in December 1974 and January 1975.
It has been necessary to recount this dramatic if dismal story in
order to provide a proper setting for the reports presented here. It
might otherwise be erroneously assumed that since they were written
a year before the enactment of the Jackson Amendment they are
now-to the extent that they are concerned with that Amend-
ment-only of historical interest. On the contrary, they are as timely
as ever, for the conditions that existed in 1973 when the Jackson
Amendment was first under serious discussion are still in existence
in 1975, namely, there are special tariff barriers erected against im-
ports into the United States from the Soviet Union and most other
Communist countries" and the Administration, supported by a com-
bination of business interests and academic groups, is exerting strong
pressure to remove those barriers in the near future.
However, the reader should not expect to find in this book an
impartial presentation of both sides of this critical question. It hardly
needs to be said that the American participants in the Conference
opposed Soviet restrictions on emigration. However, none of them
favored the use of tariff or credit restrictions as a means of attempting
to induce the Soviet government to remove those restrictions.
It should be added that a look at the Table of Contents will show
that much else is discussed in the book besides the Jackson Amend-
ment.
The chief organizers of the Conference were, on the Soviet side,
V.N. Kudriavtsev, Director of the Institute of State and Law of the
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. since 1973, and his predecessor
in that post, V.M. Chkhikvadze, and on the American side, William
D. Rogers, a Washington lawyer, who in 1973-74 was President of the
American Society of International Law, and Professor John N. Haz-
ard of Columbia University, who was then one of the vice-presidents
of the Society. They were greatly assisted by Charles W. Maynes of
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which provided the
financial support for the Conference. Columbia Law School served as
host.
In addition to the seven Soviet and five American reporters
whose contributions are presented in these pages, three other Ameri-
Japan, West Germany, and other industrial countries was proportionately greater than
that of Soviet trade with the United States.
8. In August 1975 Romania acceded to the requirements of Title IV of the Trade
Act of 1974 and obtained Congressional approval of the grant of most-favored-nation
treatment. It thus joins Poland as a "non-market economy" entitled to receive the
benefits of U.S. tariff reductions made since the enactment of the first Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act in 1934. (Poland is saved by a "grandfather clause" in Title IV,
as is Yugoslavia, if Yugoslavia can be considered to be a "non-market economy.")
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cans-Martin Domke, Donald Straus, and Isaac Shapiro-presented
excellent supplementary papers and participated in the discussions.
Mr. Rogers and Professor Hazard also participated in the discussions.
John R. Connor, Jr., a vice-president of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and
Economic Council, took part in two of the sessions. On the Soviet
side, E.A. Vorankova of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Trade also
participated in the Conference although she did not present a report.
The discussions of the reports were lively and interesting, but
they did not lend themselves to lengthy reproduction. Instead, highly
abbreviated summaries have been inserted at several points in the
text.
For the participants, the Conference-the first to be held be-
tween Soviet and American legal scholars'-provided an important
opportunity for an open and friendly exchange of professional opin-
ions. The justification for publishing this book, however, is not the
need to have a record of the proceedings but rather the hope that its
readers will find it interesting, informative, and useful in analyzing
and evaluating legal and institutional aspects of Soviet-American
trade.
Harold J. Berman
9. A conference of Soviet and American legal scholars was scheduled to be held
in 1965, sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools and the Institute of
State and Law of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, but the Soviet side withdrew
because of United States bombing of North Vietnam. The American reports were
published by the Association of American Law Schools under the title THE LAW OF
U.S.-U.S.S.R. TRADE: PAPERS PREPARED FOR A CONFERENCE OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN
LEGAL. SCHOLARS (1965).
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